which sought to raise voluntary contributions from the public.
Complex and costly, the reconstruction of Todai-ji took many years to accomplish; but the first step, the recasting of the image's head, was finished in 1185, shortly before the victory of the Minamoto over the Taira in the Genpei War. The earliest stage of the project, in short, was completed while the country was still in the throes of civil conflict and in dire economic straits. Moreover, though Nara's second great temple, Kofuku-ji, had been destroyed at the same time, it never became the object of a nationwide restoration effort.
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Todai-ji had priority: constructed by the Emperor Shomu 聖 武 (r_ 724-749) as both a symbol or imperial power and a mechanism for the exercise of that power, it could not be left in ruins. The res toration, moreover, was especially important for a monarchy buffeted by war and by challenges to its prerogatives by an upstart warrior class，and for a civilian aristocracy that depended on the institution of the monarchy for its political power.
The use of a k a n jin campaign to raise revenue for Todai-ji s res toration was intended to bolster the power and authority of the throne. For one thing, the campaign was reminiscent of a similar effort to finance the founding of Todai-ji in the mid-eighth century, when the monarchy was at the height of its political power. More over, in requesting the voluntary help of all the people to rebuild a monument to imperial glory，the throne involved the public in an integrated project that transcended the divisions of early medieval society. In effect, the rebuilding of Tbdai-ji -and the way in which revenue was sought for the project-was meant to strengthen the throne's claim to jurisdiction over all Japan' in contrast to the more limited claims of the bushi (warrior) houses involved in the Genpei War.
Toaai-ji a n d the Throne
The Japanese throne was a complex institution, supported ideolog ically by both indigenous and foreign concepts. Legitimacy came, first of all，from the claim that the monarch was descended from Amaterasu, kami (deity) of the sun and the highest figure in the native pantheon. During the process of the centralization of power in the seventh and eighth centuries, the monarch was also promoted as a Chinese-style political ruler in charge of land and official appointments, as a Confucian ruler who nurtured his people, and as a link between cosmos and people, nature and nation, also in Chinese style.
In addition, the monarch derived legitimacy from Buddhism, which served several important functions in the process of state formation in the seventh and eighth centuries. Buddhism "protected the nation" ： monks performed ceremonies meant to guarantee both the personal welfare of the monarch and his ministers, and the security and prosperity of the nation as a whole. Through patronage of Buddhist institutions, the monarch could demonstrate the largesse and the grandeur of the throne. Devotion to Buddhism enhanced the image of the monarch as a virtuous ruler, Perhaps most impor tant, however, was that Buddhism -if its institutions and symbol system were monopolized -could help to unify Japanese society under the throne.
This can be illustrated most powerfully by the Emperor ShSmu's construction of an integrated system of state Buddhism with T^dai-ji at its center (see Piggott 1987, pp. 5-6; Matsunaga and Matsunaga 1974, pp. 120-23) . Shomu, in fact, was attempting to create two parallel systems, one Buddhist and the other political. In the first, T^dai_ji occupied the center of a radiating system, with pro vincial temples (kokubunji 国 分 寺 ) on the outer ring. T^dai-ji's centrality was further symbolized by its main object of worship, a gigantic image (Daibutsu) of Roshana Buddha, from whom all phe nomena were said to emanate. The political scheme placed the throne at the center of a similarly radiating system, and provincial and local governments on the outer rings. Shomu*s adoption of "Roshana" as his religious name at the Daibutsu's dedication cere mony (Matsunaga and Matsunaga, p. 121) confirms that he saw his own position as analogous to that of the Daibutsu. Even Sh6mu*s choice of methods to finance the casting of the image were apparently motivated by his desire to integrate the na tion with the throne at the center. Construction expenses were met in part by a campaign for public donations. In his proclamation of 743 authorizing the project, Shomu declared, "If there are those whose hearts are moved to donate even a twig, a blade of grass or a clump of earth to help in the construction of this image, these offerings should all be accepted. The provincial and district officials must not intrude on the people for the sake of this project, and forcibly exact donations from them" (Kuroita 1935 [hereafter SN] )t p . 175 [743/10/15]3). The edict, in short, stipulated the collection of donations of any size, but only if they were voluntary. A few days later, the evangelist Gy5gi 订基 and his followers were dispatched to gather contributions (SN ' p . 176 [743/10/19] ). By inviting Gy5gi， s participation, Shomu made use of a popular religious leader who some decades earlier had vexed the government with his unauthorized and supposedly subversive preaching, and had once been accused of fomenting popular discontent against the gov ernment ( SN , ). In so doing, Sh6mu rejected the option of financing the project through taxes alone, which might have aroused popular protest led, perhaps, by Gy6gi himself. The emperor's motives for inviting Gy6gi， s participation may be variously interpreted. Perhaps he believed that he could defuse any objections to the expense of the grand project with the help of someone dose to the people, and with at least the appearance that the image had public and voluntary support. O r he may, as Joan R. P ig g o tt sug gests (1987, pp. 99-100〉 ，have embraced Gyogi's Mahayana ideal of evangelizing all humankind. In either case, it appears that the choice of both the method to finance the image and the man to implement that method fit one of Shomu's purposes in launching the project in the first place: to transcend internal conflict through claiming sacred legitimation (see P ig g o tt 1987, p. 5).
We have no way of knowing how successful GyOgi's campaign was, or what percentage of the expenses for the image was, in fact, met by voluntary donations. According to Todai-ji ydroku, compiled in the early twelfth century, more than two million donors contrib uted rice, wood, metal, and labor to the project (quoted in P ig g o tt 1987, p. 128) . Whether this is true or not is beside the point. What is important is that it appeared to be true, and Gyogi and his cam paign for voluntary donations became part of the story of Todai-ji^s initial construction as it was utilized by a later generation of builders. Thus Todai-ji symbolized not only the glory of a particular emperor, but also the link between the emperor and his people, who were described as willing participants in its founding.
In subsequent centuries, both l^dai-ji and the throne failed to live up to Shomu's conception of them as powerful centers of ra diating systems. In 822，when the court permitted monks to be ordained at the Tendai center at Mt. Hiei, Todai-ji^s earlier monopoly over entry into the clergy was broken. Perhaps even more important was the dissolution of the entire system of state control over Bud dhism in the Heian period: scores of unofficial temples were founded, unauthorized monks moved freely among the people, and the structure of official Buddhism was severely weakened. Todai-ji remained an important temple and became a powerful landholder and political force, but it was no longer the center of an integrated structure. As for the throne, first the emperor himself was weakened and manipulated by his Fujiwara relatives, and then the rise of virtually tax-free estates in the provinces deprived it of much of its income. Nonetheless, it had retained its institutional primacy, as the ultimate source of official appointment and the confirmation of land rights.
In 1180, however, that primacy must have seemed in danger from the expanding power of the bushi clans. The head of the Taira, Kiyomori 平 清 盛 ，had been ensconced in Kyoto since 1159. His attempt to dominate the throne, while patterned after Fujiwara methods, was much more heavy-handed than theirs had ever been: Kiyomori went so far as to place the Retired Emperor Go-Shirakawa under house arrest at one point, and even moved the capital briefly to his own power base at Fukuhara. In eastern Japan, Minamoto Yoritomo 源頼朝 was expanding his hegemony over the area, per haps even planning to establish an independent rebel state (H u rs t 1982, pp. 5-6). In short, the throne was at a crisis point in 1180, even before the destruction of Todai-ji. When Go-Shirakawa set out to restore the temple, he was not only attempting to rebuild an important Buddmst institution, he was also restoring a powerful symbol of imperial rule.
Go-Shirakawa and the Tddai-ji Kanjin Campaign
Go-Smrakawa has not fared well in history, nor was he honored in his own time.4 Minamoto Yoritomo called him "Japan's greatest tengUy' and an oracle circulated during his lifetime evaluated him thus: "The retired emperor's character is not sincere; he follows fasmon and is inconstant; his heart is not at peace; while such a situation prevails, uprisings will not cease in the realm" (Takeuchi 1978, p. 272) . The creators of Heike m onogatari 平家物語 depicted him as sly and wily, playing one bushi and noble against another, with constant thought of his own advantage. Even his own man Fujiwara Michinori 藤 原 通 憲 （ Shinzei 信西 ） ，who conducted the affairs of the Retired Emperor's office until his own death in the Heiji 平治 War of 1159, characterized Go-Shirakawa as an unen lightened ruler "without parallel in the history of China and Japan" (Sansom 1958, p. 267) . His alleged inconstancy and manipulative ness, however, can also be seen as pragmatism in defense of the throne's prerogatives.
In addition, though it was thought proper for monarchs to pa tronize literature and religion, Go-Shirakawa was criticized for ex cessive devotion to both (Takeuchi 1978，pp. 267，273 1979, p. 118) .
After the Taira victory in the Heiji uprising of 1159, Kiyomori and Go-Shirakawa had formed an uneasy alliance that lasted for twenty years. At first it appears that Kiyomori deferred to the retired emperor (see Mass 1974, pp. 127-33) -the financing of Sanjusan gendo may be one example of this-but the bushi leader cleverly established an independent route to power, marrying his daughter to the regnant emperor and becoming, in 1178, the grandfather of the future Emperor A ntoku 安 徳 . By that time relations between Kiyomori and Go-Shirakawa had become auite uncomfortable: nei ther had forgiven the other for his role in the Shishigatani affair of 1177，in which associates of the retired emperor had plotted against Kiyomori and had been discovered and harshly punished. Kiyomori had even reprimanded Go-Shirakawa himself. In 1179， clearly recognizing Kiyomori's maternal connections to the throne as a threat, Go-Smrakawa seized Taira land rights and rejected Kiyomori's candidate for high office; Kiyomori responded with a coup d'etat in which the retired emperor was placed under house arrest. This act became the pretext for rebellions on the part of the Minamoto, rivals to the Taira. Faced with this agitation, Kiyomori restored Go-Shirakawa to his position as the head of the in-no-cho 院 庁 （ Retired Emperor's Office) in 1180， but Go-Shirakawa remained under the Taira leader's thumb until the latter's death in early 1181.
It is against this background that Go-Shirakawa's concern with rebuilding Todai-ji must be evaluated. A restored Todai-ji could serve as a monument to the renewed glory of the throne, as well as to the perfidy of the Taira (a factor that must have also attracted Yoritomo's cooperation later in the rebuilding process). But where could Go-Shirakawa obtain funding for such a massive project?
State support for Todai-ji, like other important Buddhist institu tions, had been provided initially by land allotments and tax reve nues from designated sustenance households. When revenue from these sources became unreliable, Todai-ji increased its efforts to de velop shorn 荘 園 (private estates) which it could control more directly (Piggott 1982, pp. 52-3) . But for purposes of repair, official temples such as Todai-ji could still lay claim to state funds (Yasuda 1983, p. 66) . Thus Toaai-ji had two possible sources to fund its recon struction project: it could milk its own shorn, and it could receive public assistance through taxes. But it appears that early in 1181， sufficient revenue could be obtained from neither source.
In addition, though the destruction of Todai-ji caused much dis tress in the imperial court, little could be done to repair the damage as long as the government and Go-Shirakawa himself were under Kiyomori's control. Moreover' the Taira had forced the confiscation of Todai-ji estates (Kujo 1908 [hereafter GY] 1:2, p. 463 [1181/1/6])， thus cutting the temple off from its income. It was not until Kiyomori died in the intercalary second month of 1181 that reconstruction activities could be initiated. Even then Go-Shirakawa proceeded cautiously, blaming not the Taira but "bad elements" at Todai-ji and Kofuku-ji for the burning, and only tentatively suggest ing that the temples' estates be restored (G Y 1:2，p. 489 [1181/in tercalary 2/20]). Though the holdings were returned shortly,5 Todai-ji*s Bnancial problems were not solved, as Kujo Kanezane, then Minister of the Right, affirmed in his diary Gyokuyd 玉葉 .
The only truly contemporary account of the early stages of Todaij i 's reconstruction is found in this diary, compiled between 1164 and 1200. While for the most part this information can be accepted as accurate, Kanezane seems to have taken little interest in the detailed planning of the project. Thus the account must be supple mented by other sources that date from somewhat later times, such as Ch6gen's N am u A m ida Butsu sazenshu (1934 [hereafter SZS]) , writ ten in 1204, and Hyakurensho (K u ro ita 1937), a chronicle written in the late Kamakura period. The most detailed and polished ac count, however, appears in Todat-jt zoku ydrokut compiled in the late thirteenth century (Kokusho Kankokai 1907 [hereafter TZY]) . In this version, the k a n jin campaign is described as a purposeful and well-planned effort initiated by determined and pious individuals. In both its tone and some of its factual information, however, this account disagrees at times with Kanezane's. (See Table on facing page.)
According to both Zoku ydroku and Gyokuydt serious plans for re constructing Todai-ji got underway in the third month of 1181, It was then that Fujiwara Yukitaka 行 隆 , an official of Go-Shirakawa's in-no-cho and the kurodo 蔵 人 (Imperial Secretariat), arranged with bronze casting masters to remake the Daibutsu image (TZY, p. 198) . A few days later when he visited Kanezane on Go-Shirakawa's behalf, Yukitaka suggested that an imperial order be issued to chishiki 知識 (Buddhist faithful) to implement the casting of the image (G Y 1:2， p. 496 [1181/3/21] ). The use of the word chishiki suggests that this was to be a request for donations, though there is no indication that a nationwide k a n jin campaign was considered at this time.
5
B oth H o r i i k e (1976, p. 4) and A s a i and A sa i (1986, p . 14) state that temple lands were restored o n 1181/3/1,w ithout citing a source for this inform ation. The fact th at the conversa tions between Yukitaka and Kanezane reported in GyokuyC cease to make an issue o f the prob lem after 1181/intercalary 2/20， suggests that, in fact, the lands were restored. At the end of the sixth month, government officials met to decide on details of the construction project (G Y 1:2, p. 509; TZY pp. 197 98) . Yukitaka was appointed construction superintendent, and several other officials of the retired emperor's staff were chosen to assist him (Asai and Asai 1986, p. 16) . Following the recommendations of the On*ydryd 陰 陽 療 （ Bureau of Divinations), construction work was set to begin in the eighth month. According to an order passed on from Yukitaka to officials of TCdai-ji and of Yamato province, TCdaiji 's sustenance households and shoen would finance the project.
FIRST STEPS IN THE RESTORATION OF TODAI-JI
Even so, funding was still a significant problem, and there was considerable danger that the project would not get underway as planned. Gyokuyd reports a conversation that took place on 7/13 between Kanezane and Yukitaka, who bore a message from GoShirakawa. The retired emperor complained that the nation had been plagued by a series of calamities -drought, famine and insurrection -as well as by mysterious events, including a comet and the appearance of two flowers on one stem of a lotus plant, an omen of bad fortune. How, Go-Shirakawa asked, can we govern virtuously so that good will prevail over evil? Go-Shirakawa's com plaint was vague, but the destruction of the Nara temples -and the failure of the court to set about immediately to rebuild them -must have been seen as at least one cause of the disasters and bad omens that had befallen the nation. Kanezane's answer implied that this was the case. While sympathizing with the retired emperor's con cerns, Kanezane， in his own account the benevolent Confucian min ister, refused to consider raising taxes: "Whether we are discussing the restoration of the two temples [Todai-ji and Kofuku-ji] or pro visions for warriors of our defending army, if we lay the expenses on the people it would really be quite a burden for them. Even in good years, these farmers lead hard lives; how much more so when they are dying of starvation!" (G Y 1:2， p. 514 [1181/7/13]). Kanezane and messengers from Go-Shirakawa debated the issue for the next two days, without reaching any firm decision.
That autumn, apparently, a decision was made to finance Todai-ji^ reconstruction in part through a k a n jin campaign. Though such campaigns had become quite common by the late twelfth century, they were not the standard means to meet expenses at major reli gious institutions. As private efforts rooted in popular religious be liefs, campaigns were more suitable for small and medium-sized temples that obtained their main support from the populace at large» than for a great institution such as Todai-ji, established by imperial order as a religious underpinning for the state. In the difficult times of 1181, however，it must have seemed necessary to seek revenue from every possible source. Even though Todai-jfs shorn had once more become available, the temple's economic base had been weak ening for some time, and the problem was exacerbated by continuing disputes with Kofuku-ji over holdings in Yamato province (Asai and Asai 1986, p. 16 ). In addition, it appears that the traditional mech anism for accomplishing repair work had long since failed the temple (Nagamura 1981, p. 64). Repairs had originally been the responsi bility of the betto 当 (administrator), but from late Heian times that office had been filled by Shingon monks who did not live at the temple and sometimes neglected their duties. Thus the resident monks at the temple had to look elsewhere, and this prepared the way for the k a n jin campaign as an alternate revenue source.
Looking Back to Shomu
Such explanations are certainly valid，but I think yet another factor should be considered: the desire o f the court, especially GoShirakawa, to use Todai-ji*s reconstruction to enhance the power and prestige of the throne. If a nationwide k a n jin campaign were used to collect revenue for the project, it would be a concrete testament to the power of the throne to mobilize people and re sources from anywhere in Japan, and thus to lay claim as no bushi leader could to jurisdiction over the entire nation.
Calling for a nationwide campaign may have been economically necessary; politically it was a bold step. The Taira still held power in the capital, and Go-Shirakawa and Kanezane had to be careful not to offend them. This may be one reason why, in conversations between Kanezane and Go-Shirakawa's messengers in the seventh month of 1 1 8 1 (G Y 1:2，pp. 514-15), temple reconstruction was joined to two other questions: how to deal with "bad monks** -pre sumably the ones that had invited the retribution of the Taira-and how to finance the Taira war effort. It seems as if Go-Shirakawa and Kanezane were ready to offer the Taira a quid pro quo: do not interfere with our efforts to rebuild Todai-ji and Kofuku-ji, and in exchange we will keep monastic armies under control and provide for your soldiers.
To investigate the k a n jin campaign itself and Chogen*s role in implementing it, we must turn to Zoku ydroku . According to this source, Chogen approached Yukitaka in the fourth month of 1181, explaining that a dream oracle had sent him to visit Todai-ji, where he had lamented the destruction of the Dai butsu. Yukitaka, recognizing help when he saw it, suggested that an imperial order authorizing a k a n jin campaign might be obtained. Such an order was promulgated in the sixth month, and two months later, we are told, Chogen built six one-wheeled carts, and he and his followers canvassed "the seven circuits and all the provinces， " requesting donations through a written appeal (TZY, p. 199) . The imperial order and Chogen、 k a n jin appeal are reproduced in this text, along with a document written in 1185 by Chogen which corroborates the earlier account.6
Reminiscing many years later, Chogen wrote in N am u A m ida Butsu sazenshu:
Some twenty-three years have passed between the time when, at age sixty-one, I received the imperial order to rebuild Todai-ji, and now, when I have reached the age of eighty-three. After six years the construction of the Daibutsu The reference to the imperial order is, to my knowledge, the earliest independent confirmation of the Zoku ydroku account. The account is also supported by a passage in the late-Kamakura history Hyakurenshd (K u ro ita 1937, p. 106): "O n the 26th day [of the sixth month of 1181], the decision to rebuild Todai-ji was made, and a petition for assistance was circulated among the Buddhist faithful."
The edict (TZYt p. 199; Hashim oto and H oriike 1940, pp. 118 19) was clearly the work of Go-Shirakawa, though it was formally promulgated by the reigning Emperor Antoku, a small boy who of course had nothing to do with it. After the death of Kiyomori, however, Go-Shirakawa had reassumed partial control of the state apparatus; thus it was doubtless he who dictated the edict, a con tention that can be supported by its laudatory treatment of him. Throughout the document, parallels are drawn between Shomu*s original construction of the temple, and the throne's current resto ration plans. The edict sometimes quotes directly from Shomu's proc lamation (direct or near-direct quotations are printed in italics).
The document opens with a pious expression of reverence for the imperial line and concern for its preservation:
Tender of age as we are, we gratefully laud [past] imperial achieve ments, rely upon the protection of our ancestors, and earnestly pay heed to the safety of the imperial line. In regard to this, in Yamato province Sofunokam i添上 district， there was constructed a great temple with ajdroku丈 パ ' gilt bronze image that Emperor Shomu had cast in the Tenpyo era 天 平 . The roof of the temple soared to the heavens, and the sacred brilliance of the image surpassed that of the full moon; truly there is nothing to compare with it in Japan or C h in a .. . .
When the fires of the Taira lay waste to the temple, 7 Sometimes mistakenly translated as sixteen feet, or more accurately, sixteen meters (the D aibutsu was actually more than fifty-three feet tall). B uddhist images are often described as jdroku in he igh t, the m ythical he ight o f the historical B uddha.
Zenjo Sen'in 禅定イ山院[Go-Shirakawa] heard o f the matter and， deeply moved, had the temple's foundation stones preserved in their original arrangement， trees to reconstruct the building cut in the mountains, a casting mold made by skilled artisans， and cop per obtained from the provinces. He desired to rebuild the temple with these materials, and the intent of his imperial vow truly suf fices as a grateful response [to Sh6mu's establishment of the tem ple]. It is We who possess the wealth of the land; it is We who possess a ll power in the land. With this wealth and power at O ur command' we shall certainly assist others to achieve meditative power and wisdom8 and shall, moreover, act in accord with the desire expressed long ago by the sainted founder of the temple.
Turning to the matter of financing the rebuilding project, the edict states:
We ought to appeal to both clergy and lay believers for donations, for everyone from royalty and ministers of state down to palanquin bearers and low-class servants should pay homage daily to the image of Roshana, so that with constant devotion we can construct the image our selves. Long ago the Emperor Shomu fervently desired the salva tion of all creatures. In his chambers he prayed to the Shinto kami, and publicly he encouraged the world to follow the Buddhist law, graciously issuing imperial orders and accomplishing many good deeds. We must follow such ancient practices and restore this ven erable monument! Those who give alms for this purpose, even though it be only a grain of rice, a half penny, a small tool or a log one foot in length, shall prosper forever and everywhere through the power of their good deeds....
The edict goes on to emphasize the value of small donations to the project, likening them to small particles that form a great mountain, or tiny brooks that make up the ocean. After promising good karma and salvation to donors, and peace and prosperity in the realm, the edict, like that of Shomu, warns its executors: "The officials of the Kinai，the seven circuits and all the provinces must not intrude on the people fo r the sake o f this project,"
In summary, the edict recalls ShQmu's role in the founding of Todai-ji and quotes directly from his proclamation to emphasize the parallel between him and Go-Shirakawa. Furthermore, the edict im plies a connection between the welfare of the imperial line and the reconstruction of T^dai-ji; it also points out the responsibility that everyone bears for the project, and specifies a broad-based voluntary k a n jin campaign to finance it
The Zoku ydroku narrative which contains the edict also establishes a second parallel, between . According to the account, when ChCgen first approached Yukitaka to volunteer his services, Yukitaka replied, "In the Tenpy5 era, Gyogi Bosatsu was given the imperial order [to rebuild T^dai-ji] and thus proceeded to conduct a k a n jin campaign." In his k a n jin appeal, moreover, Chogen declares that when Todai-ji was founded, M Gyogi Bosatsu brought to fruition the devotion of Buddhist believers" 一 much, it is implied, as Chogen himself intends to do.
Though most Japanese scholars tend to accept the Zoku ydroku account, there are reasons to doubt its complete accuracy. Ch5gen*s appeal carries a bogus date, the eighth month of the first year of Yowa; the Yowa era did not begin until the tenth month. (The imperial order, however, is dated correctly.) While this may have been a copyist's error, it may also mean that the appeal itself was composed somewhat later, perhaps in order to help form a logical story. In addition, the Zoku ydroku account shows none of the floun dering that becomes apparent when we read Kanezane's diary. In Zoku ydroku, the k a n jin campaign began officially in the eighth month but the imperial order was dated in the sixth month, indicating that this method of raising revenue had been chosen. But in Gyokuyd， Go-Shirakawa is still wringing his hands in the middle of the seventh month. Kanezane mentions nothing about Chogen and the k a n jin campaign until the tenth month, when he notes that the M Todai-ji alms-collecting shonin 聖人 went around to all houses in the capital asking for donations-beginning with the retired emperor -and not asking whether a household be noble or base. The Nyoin 女院 [Sutoku's 崇徳 empress and Kanezane's sister, Kokamon'in 皇嘉門 院 ] contributed ten catties of bronze, and others gave a thousand kanmon 貫文 of cash or six ryd 両 of gold" (G Y 1:2， p. 532 [1181/10/9]).
It may have been his sister's substantial gift that interested Kanezane in the Todai-ji campaign, rather than any importance that he at tributed to the k a n jin effort itself.
Gyokuyd,s record of the stumbling efforts of Go-Shirakawa and Kanezane in the middle of 1181 seems somewhat more true to life than the decisive steps described in Zoku ydroku; yet the later account should not be dismissed out of hand. Both Sazenshu and Gyokuyd indicate that an imperial order authorizing a k a n jin campaign was in fact promulgated sometime in midyear. The Zoku ydroku version is probably how the entire effort: was meant to be seen, perhaps by Todai-ji, perhaps by Chogen, perhaps by Go-Shirakawa, but most likely by all three. It was Go-Shirakawa, in fact, who had the biggest stake in creating a story of a unified, purposeful effort-a story in which Chogen played the part of Gyogi and he himself took the role of the Emperor Shomu.
The association of Gyogi with the collection of donations for Todaiji, though based on an accepted historical account, seems to have become part of the popular Gyogi legend only after Chogen's cam paign. Heian period sources such as Hokke genki 法華験記 and Konja k u moTwmtan shu portray Gv5ffi as a miracle-worker and popular evangelist who helped people in practical ways, such as building roads and bridges, and whose virtues eventually attracted imperial patronage. He appears at the Todai-ji dedication, but not in his k a n jin role (Dykstra 1983, pp. 27-9 . It is my conjecture that some time in the process of Chogen*s campaign, the Gyogi legend was embellished with a little-known item from the Shoku N iho ng i, in an attempt to use popular veneration of Gyogi to validate a widespread k a n jin effort.
It is unclear to what extent Chogen was successful in obtaining donations from ordinary people. His appeal echoes the request for small donations in the im perial edicts of 1181 and 743. Yet there is little information on what ordinary people actually gave; the initial donations noted in Gyokuyd, one thousand kanmon of cash or six ryd of gold, are a far cry from a length of cloth. Perhaps the ocean indeed could be formed from the water of tiny brooks, but the contributions of major rivers would fill it up much more efficiently. In addition, if the peasants were as close to starvation as Kanezane claimed, then they would not have had anything to give. It is likely that Todai-ji received small donations from the general populace, but that the most important donors from a practical point of view were people such as Minamoto Yoritomo, who contributed silk, gold dust, and ten thousand koku 石 of rice (Hayakawa 1923: I, p. 112) .
If the true purpose of the k a n jin campaign, however, was to unite people around the throne to rebuild a monument to imperial glory, then it was more important for the campaign to look like a popular effort than it was to actually be one.
The Selection o f Chogen
If Go-Shirakawa was the catalyst that launched the reconstruction of Todai-ji, then Chogen was the force that drove the project to its successful conclusion. His appointment put him in charge not only of the collection of donations, but also of the entire construction process at the temple，a position of great power and influence. The appointment turned out to be a fortunate one for T5dai-ji, since Chogen was a perspicacious man skilled not only in k a n jin methods, but also in shepherding artists, managing revenue, and setting the project's priorities.
The selection of Chogen requires some explanation. He was an aging monk who had attained no distinguished ecclesiastical rank, had written no commentaries on the scriptures or sophisticated doc trinal treatises, and had no previous connection to T5dai-ji. O n the other hand, he had already supervised the construction of two tem ple buildings, and had conducted smaller-scale k a n jin campaigns, winning the patronage of provincial notables and the devotion of ordinary people.9 In other words, his technological skill and his ability to attract a wide spectrum of potential donors overcame his relatively low social position and recommended him to court officials such as Yukitaka.
Little is known about Chogen's life prior to his Todai-ji appoint ment. His autobiography, N am u A m ida Butsu sazenshu, primarily con cerns his "good deeds" (sazen) of constructing temples, images, and baths, but contains a few details about his early life (SZS, . Another source is the commentary that he wrote in 1185, on the occasion of the Daibutsu's dedication (TZY, . Several schol ars have used that information, inscriptions, hagiography and anec dotes to patch together a sketchy picture of his life.10 He is said to have been born in the capital to a branch of the Ki family with connections to both the kurodo and the Retired Emperor Toba's guards. Chogen took Buddhist orders as a boy, perhaps as young as age thirteen, entering the Shingon temple Daigo-ji 醒翻寺 on the outskirts of Kyoto. When he was still quite young he undertook Shugend5 practice, traveling to sacred mountains in central Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and the Tohoku region, and reciting and copying the Lotus S utra. He claimed to have traveled to China three times, and it may have been on these travels that he obtained the tech nological skill that enabled him to design the Daibutsuden.
Like many of his contemporaries, Chogen was devoted to Amida throughout his lifetime. He took credit for making thirty-seven im ages of Amida and he eventually adopted the name of Namu Amida Butsu, the invocation (nenbutsu) recited by followers of the Pure Land faith (Kobayashi 1971, pp. 13-6) . In particular, he advocated chanting the nenbutsu while bathing, and had baths established at temples and elsewhere, combining practical good work that pro moted cleanliness and good health with a ritual that both propagated the nenbutsu and symbolized spiritual cleansing (Gorai 1975, pp. 182-85) . Biographies of the Pure Land school founder Honen claim close connections between him and Chogen; indeed, both had similar iaith in the nenbutsu and a similar concern with popular preaching. Chogen is most closely associated, however, with the nenbutsu h tjm 聖 (ascetics) at M t Koya, where he took up residence sometime before 1176. Scholars have questioned Chogen's lineage, his exact relationship with Honen, and his journeys to China, but the rest of this information is generally accepted, and provides us with a picture of an unexceptional religious figure of the h tjtri type so common in late Heian Japan: one who combined mountain asceti cism, devotion to Amida and the Lotus Sutra, and construction work that benefited both temples and the general populace (see Goodwin 1989) . According to some sources in the Pure Land tradition (e.g., K u ro d a n i Genka shonin den 黒谷源空上人伝，quoted in Kobayashi 1971, p. 64), the first choice for the Todai-ji k an jtn position was Honen, who declined but recommended Ch5gen instead. Though this may be an invention of Honen's hagiographers, it suggests that one important qualification for the head of the k a n jin campaign was closeness to the people, of the type that Honen and Ch5gen had established. Both men, moreover, had developed ties with court func tionaries as well as with ordinary folk. In other words, they were not merely vagabond h ijir i unworthy of official notice, but potential intermediaries between court and populace.
In particular, Chogen seems to have attracted the patronage of Minamoto Moroyuki 師 行 ，Minister of the Treasury, a zuryo 受領 (provincial governor) and client of the Retired Emperor Toba (Gomi 1984，pp. 402-3) . Moroyuki was the main contributor to a k a n jin campaign that Chogen conducted for the construction of a temple building at Daigo-ji. In 1176 Chogen conducted another campaign for a bronze bell at Koya*s Enju-in 延 寿 院 ，dedicated to persons identified as Moroyuki and two of his sons, and to an unidentified nun, perhaps another family member. One of the sons to whom the bell was dedicated was a monk at Todai-ji*s Tonan-in 東南院 (Kobayashi 1971, p. 46) , and he may very well have suggested that Chogen undertake the restoration k a n jin project. More generally speaking, the mediation of a powerful provincial functionary must have stood Chogen in good stead in establishing a relationship with the court.
Another useful connection for Chogen was with the kurodo, in wmch Yukitaka held an important position. The connection may have been established through Chogen*s own family or through Moroyuki, who had contacts with the bureau. The kurodo had charge of important iron casters groups, one of which participated in the reconstruction of the Daibutsu and also assisted Chogen later with such projects as the casting of bath cauldrons at Daigo-ji and an iron pagoda at Suびs 周防 Amida-dera 阿 弥 陀 寺 （ Amino 1975, p. 365) .
Important as Chogen's connections may have been, it was his muen 無縁 status -his lack of permanent connections to any single temple, patron, or government office -that also made him an ap propriate choice to head Go-Shirakawa's kanjtn campaign. Prior to his appointment at Todai-ji, Chogen resembled muen h tjtri, itinerants who wandered from temple to temple performing services such as alms collection. Even after he assumed responsibility for the Todai-ji campaign, he remained an outsider whose priorities for reconstruc tion differed from those of the regular monks (Nagamura 1981, p. 72). Free of entanglements and able to move freely from one social milieu to another, Chogen -like other muen ftyzn_was in an ideal position to attract donors. In addition, his muen status may have been of value in establishing ties with Go-Shirakawa, since muen people had a special relationship to the throne. According to Amino Yoshihiko (1978) , the category muen included not only h tjtr i but also vagabond craftsmen and peddlers, as well as the roads they traveled and the ports and markets where they sold their wares. By the late Heian period the throne had established its jurisdiction over muen people and places. For example, it granted licenses to certain craftsmen to travel freely, without the payment of tolls assessed to most people (Amino 1975, pp. 358-60, 366-67) .
In fact, vagabond craftsmen often sought the status of kugonin 供御人 or purveyors to the imperial household, because it would free them from the jurisdiction of any entity but the throne. Ch6gen's right to travel nationwide to collect donations was of the same order as a kug o nin， s rights (Amino 1975, p. 367 ).
Amino's ideas intersect with those of the anthropologist Yamag uchi Masao (1977, pp. 152-57) , who associates both h ijir i and mon arch with the mythical figure of the stranger (marodogami 客神 or hitogam i 人 神 ) who brings both bounty and danger to the isolated village community. As the Japanese terms indicate, the stranger was considered to be no ordinary human being, but one who possessed the charisma of a kami. His ability to transcend the structures of individual communities gave him power and freedom that no one within the community could muster, and k a n jin h ijir i, as I have pointed out elsewhere (1989，pp. 146-47), often used this ability to their advantage. Such power and freedom was also possessed in theory by the emperor, with his command over the places and people that lay under no one else's control. In one sense these were "leftover" people and places, outside the structure of agricultural society on which bushi power was based. In another sense they were the nodes and channels of a communications network that helped to integrate the whole nation. And that integration, Yamaguchi ar gues, was precisely the monarch's duty. Yamaguchi maintains，however, that the monarch "could not manifest his force directly, because it could be antisocial if it were manifested without modification" （ p. 157). If this argument is applied to the events of 1181, it appears that Go-Shirakawa faced quite a dilemma. On the one hand bushi power, which relied more on actual control of provincial land and people than on titles granted by the throne, was threatening the throne's institutional primacy. Thus there was a need for a powerful example of the throne's ability to integrate the nation. The reconstruction of Todai-ji might fit this need; yet were that accomplished through taxation, it might be regarded as "antisocial," as Kanezane's objections indicate. The choice of a k a n jin campaign which appeared to be both voluntary and widespread, can be understood in this light. Chogen, who stood outside the fractured social structure that Go-Shirakawa was attempt ing to transcend and perhaps even to unify, thus appears to be a logical selection to head the campaign.
The D aibutsu Opens Its Eyes
The reconstruction of Toaai-ji was an immense task that took a century to complete. Revenues collected in Ch6gen's k a n jin campaign played only a small part in financing the project. Additional support was provided by Yoritomo, who assessed "donations" from his vassals with little pretense that they were voluntary gifts; and most impor tantly, by the assignment of revenues from Su6 and Bizen provinces. Yet it was the voluntary k a n jin campaign that set the tone for the reconstruction effort. For one thing, the initial step in recasting the Daibutsu's head, the construction of the mold, was funded largely through donations collected by Ch6gen (G Y 1:2，p. 554 [1182/2/20] ). Without the campaign, moreover, it would have been difficult for Go-Shirakawa to claim that both the throne and the people had participated in a national effort to reconstruct a monument to im perial glory.
In the eighth month of 1185，a dedication ceremony was held for the image of Roshana (G Y II, pp. 97-8 [1185/8/28-30] ). The work had been completed with the help of courtiers, bushi, and the common people, who gathered at the ceremony, as "numerous as the sands of the Ganges." Go-Shirakawa himself painted in the eyes of the image. One of Kanezane's companions on the trip home from Nara criticized this as inappropriate conduct: "The retired emperor has become a busshi 仏 師 (artist-monk)! What precedent is there for this?" But another replied, "The precedent is from the Tenpy6 era, when the Emperor Sh6mu, retired at that time, took the brush himself and deigned to paint in the eyes [of the original Daibutsu]." It seems likely that this story, which is not the standard account, was promoted by Go-Shirakawa in an attempt to identify himself with Shomu, and the twelfth-century throne with the throne in its glory days of the eighth century.
Religious legitimation of the throne's authority must have seemed as important to Go-Shirakawa in 1185 as it did in 1181. Despite the fact that he had eventually thrown his support to Yoritomo, Go-Shirakawa was in a precarious position after the Minamoto vie-tory over the Taira at Dannoura. Yoritomo's refusal to permit his followers to accept court appointments clearly established his inde pendent authority over the Kanto bushi. Thus Go-Shirakawa had failed to make Yoritomo his client, and a new bushi leader posed a challenge to court and throne. Later that year, the retired emperor turned for support to Yoritomo's brother Yoshitsune; but neither that nor the reconstruction of Todai-ji succeeded, as we know, in restoring the throne to the position it had held in Shomu's day. Yet perhaps the respectful treatment of emperor and court by the early rulers of Kamakura rested in part on the knowledge that no bushi leader of the age could claim a relationship to all the people comparable to that of the throne.
ABBREVIATIONS
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